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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, a variety of consumer protection statutes have
been adopted on both the federal and state levels.' These laws are legislative
attempts to regulate the business relationship between sellers and consumers.
In this relationship:
Deception is the classic consumer problem. From an early time the law has
provided remedies for the buyer who has been deceived. As marketing and con-
sumer services have become more complex, the private remedies of the common
law, and traditional criminal actions, have become relatively ineffective as a
means by which the consumer may protect himself, and government has inter-
vened. 2
The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Ac is such an intervention. The Act is
modeled after the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,4 promulgated by
the National Conference on Uniform State Laws and approved by the
American Bar Association, and is "an effort to crystallize the best elements of
contemporary federal and state regulation of consumer sales practices in or-
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versity.
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1. Some examples include the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1976), the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1976 & Supp. 111978), the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1976), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 et seq. (West
1964), the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 et seq. (Page 1979), the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 73 § 201-1 et seq.
(Purdon 1971), and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. BUS. & COMM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1968 & Supp. July 1981).
2. Thomas v. Sun Furniture and Appliance Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 78, 81, 399 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1978).
3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 et seq. (Page 1979).
4. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcTIcEs AcT.
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der to effectuate harmonization and coordination of federal and state regula-
tion. "'5 One of the main purposes of both the Uniform and the Ohio acts is to
compensate for the inadequacy of traditional consumer remedies by simplify-
ing, clarifying, and modernizing the law governing consumer sales practices.
6
The Ohio Act prohibits unfair or deceptive and unconscionable acts or prac-
tices by suppliers in consumer transactions. 7 Consumers are provided with a
variety of remedies, 8 and the Ohio Attorney General has the power to "adopt,
amend and repeal substantive rules defining with reasonable specificity acts
or practices that violate sections 1345.02 [unfair or deceptive conduct] and
1345.03 [unconscionable conduct] of the Revised Code," 9 to investigate,"
and to take legal action" to enforce the Act. This Article discusses the scope
of the Act, prohibited acts or practices, the relation of the Act to other
consumer legislation, and the private remedies provided by the Act.'2
II. SCOPE
A. The Act in General
The Consumer Sales Practices Act is a remedial law designed to compen-
sate for the inadequacies of traditional consumer remedies and must therefore
5. Toledo Metro Fed. Credit Union v. Ted Papenhagen Oldsmobile, 56 Ohio App. 2d218, 220, 381 N.E.2d
1337, 1339 (1978).
6. See UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 1(I).
7. Unfair or deceptive acts or practices are defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02 (Page 1979).
Unconscionable acts or practices are defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Page 1979).
8. Private remedies are listed under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (Page 1979). Merchants dealing
with consumers are provided with only two defenses to civil liability under the Act. If the supplier can show, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the "violation resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid the error ... no party shall be awarded attorney's fees
and monetary recovery shall not exceed the amount ofactual damages resulting from the violation." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.11(A) (Page 1979). While this language has rarely been used as a defense in Ohio, similar
language in the Federal Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(C) (1976), has been construed to exclude liability
only for clerical errors, provided there was a system in place to detect such errors. Ellis v. Hensley, No. 39126
(Cuyahoga County Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1979) at 7-8. See Mirabel v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d
871 (7th Cir. 1976).
The second defense allows the supplier to escape liability only if he shows that he acted in reliance on
Federal Trade Commission orders, trade regulations, rules and guides, or certain federal court interpretations of
the same. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.11 (B) (Page 1979). Because of the narrowness of this defense, it is not
likely to be used with any frequency.
The constitutionality of both sections 1345.02 and 1345.03 of the Ohio Revised Code has been challenged in
Ohio courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Lawyer's Tax Service, No. 70-2410 (Lucas County C.P. August 5, 1980)
(overbreadth); Brown v. Barnum, No. 79-2410 (Lucas County C.P. August 5, 1979) (vagueness). These argu-
ments have been dismissed. Typically, the Barnum court said that "[g]iven the body of rapidly developing
consumer protection law defining 'deceptive' and 'unconscionable' this court cannot, within the context of the
statute, find the meaning of these two terms any more indefinite, vague or uncertain in their application" than
the phrase "unfair methods of competition" which was upheld in Sears Roebuck and Co. v. F.T.C., 258 F. 307,
311 (7th Cir. 1919). Brown v. Barnum, No. 79-2410 (Lucas County C.P. August 5, 1979) at 8. These phrases are
established legal terminology that depend on a process ofjudicial inclusion and exclusion for their meaning. The
courts must be free to pass on a wide range of conduct rather than be limited to working with a specific
statutorily defined list of prohibited behavior that could be circumvented by suppliers. Id. at 9.
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B)(2) (Page 1979). These powers, originally conferred upon the
Director of Commerce, were transferred to the Attorney General by Amended Substitute Senate Bill 221 of the
112th General Assembly (effective Nov. 23, 1977).
10. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (Page 1979).
II. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07 (Page 1979).
12. For a discussion of the powers of the Attorney General under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, see
Tongren & Samuels, The Development of Consumer Protection Activities in the Ohio Attorney General's Office,
37 OHIO ST. L.J. 581 (1976).
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be liberally construed. 3 However, the Act specifically excludes "[a] pub-
lisher, broadcaster, printer, or other person engaged in the dissemination of
information or the reproduction of printed or pictorial matter insofar as the
information or matter has been disseminated or reproduced on behalf of
others without knowledge that it violated sections 1345.01 to 1345.13 of the
Revised Code.' '4 Thus, for example, the Act would not apply to radio or
television stations that broadcast deceptive advertisements for others unless
that station was actually aware that the advertisement violated the Act. Nor
does the Act apply to -[c]laims for personal injury or death."' 5
Finance companies and banks are specifically exempted from the Ohio
Act.' 6 This exemption extends to finance companies and banks that receive
discounted promissory notes generated by such consumer contracts as health
spa memberships.' 7 Transactions between public utilities, insurance com-
panies, attorneys, physicians, or dentists and their clients are also specifically
excepted from the Act.'8 The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act does not
apply to the sale or purchase of real estate.' 9 However, the Act does apply to
those who render services in the construction or repair of single family dwel-
lings" or those who render other services to dwelling units.'
B. Consumer Transactions
Before a consumer can seek the protection provided by Ohio's Consumer
Sales Practices Act, he or she must first engage in a consumer transaction.
The Act defines a consumer transaction as "a sale, lease, assignment, award
by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, franchise, or an
intangible .... to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal,
13. "Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. The rule of common law that statutes in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed has no application to remedial laws." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1. 11
(Page 1979). Accord Brown v. Market Development Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 63, 322 N.E.2d 367, 371 (1974). See
also UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 1, which states "this Act shall be construed liberally."
14. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.12(B) (Page 1979).
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.12(C) (Page 1979).
16. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page Supp. 1980) (financial institutions as defined in § 5725.01
are specifically exempted).
17. Brown v. Willard, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 195 (Ct. App. 1977).
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page Supp. 1980).
19. In Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 358 A.2d 473 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), the court refused
to construe the New Jersey Deceptive Practices Act, N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (West 1964), to apply to a real
estate sale because the statute focused on the sale of personal, as opposed to real, property and because real
estate brokers are subject to testing, licensing, regulations and other penalties. The Ohio Act is similar to the
New Jersey Deceptive Practices Act, and using the Neveroski rationale, Ohio courts will most likely limit the
scope of the Act to transactions involving personal property or services.
20. OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-01(C) (1979). See also MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977). The court rejected a home builder's arguments that his failure to honor promises to remedy defects
in the construction of a house and to replace nonconforming carpeting was not covered by the state deceptive
practices act, which is similar to the Ohio Act. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.01 (Vernon
1968). The builder's obligations under his warranty to repair defects were considered to be the sale of a service
as distinct from his sale of the real estate.
21. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977) (Texas deceptive practices act applies to repairs to
the sewer system), and Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 358 A.2d 473 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(termite treatment and guarantee contract on a house sold is within the coverage of the New Jersey deceptive
practices statute).
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family, or household, or a solicitation to supply any of these things."' The
scope is limited to individuals who acquire items from suppliers primarily for
personal use, but, apart from the exclusions, it encompasses all who deal
directly or indirectly with consumers. A consumer transaction includes solici-
tations to supply goods or services P and the Act further states that an unfair
or deceptive and unconscionable act or practice can occur before, during, or
after the transaction.24
It is not necessary that a sale actually take place before liability can be
imposed under the Consumer Sales Practices Act. In Weaver v. J.C. Penney
Co. ,25 the supplier violated a substantive rule promulgated under section
1345.05(B)(2) of the Revised Code, which at that time prohibited refusal to
issue rainchecks or take orders for advertised goods or services after the
original quantities were exhausted unless the supplier clearly and adequately
disclosed that a specific quantity was available.26 This is one example of a
pre-sale solicitation that violated the Act even though there was no subse-
quent sale. In some situations then, a consumer could be in a store, not
intending to make a purchase, and still recover under the Act should the
supplier commit an unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable act in making the
sales pitchy.
The Consumer Sales Practices Act extends to periods after the sale and
includes assurances given to consumers who complain and threats made to
stifle such complaints. 28 The consumer-supplier relationship-the trans-
action-exists from the time of the sale until a debt is completely paid off.29
The Act thus expands existing consumer remedies under the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 0 which exempts creditors who collect their own
debts3' (as opposed to those who use a debt collection agency). For example,
in Santiago v. S. S. Kresge Co.,32 the defendant-supplier's practice of suing
consumers in distant and inconvenient forums to collect its own debts was
held an unconscionable practice and a violation of the Ohio Act. The assign-
ment of a debt is also part of the consumer transaction, and the person
22. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page Supp. 1980).
23. Id.
24. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.02(A), 1345.03(A) (Page 1979).
25. 53 Ohio App. 2d 165, 372 N.E.2d 633 (1977).
26. Id. at 168, 372 N.E.2d at 635. A consumer need not prove actual reliance to recover under the
Consumer Sales Practices Act. See text accompanying notes 60-65 infra. Cf. OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-03
(1977) as amended June 8, 1981 (four exceptions are proposed to the "raincheck" requirement).
27. Under § 1345.09(B) of the Revised Code a consumer may recover the greater of two hundred dollars or
treble actual damages where the violation is an act or practice declared to be deceptive or unconscionable by
rule or an act or practice determined by a court of this state to violate section 1345.02 or 1345.03 of the Revised
Code and committed after the decision containing the determination has been made available for public inspec-
tion in the Public Inspection File in the Attorney General's office. Thus, damages may be available even where a
sale does not take place.
28. Buckley, Recent Consumer Protection Legislation in Ohio, 22 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 393, 397 (1973).
29. See Liggins v. May Co., 53 Ohio Misc. 21, 23, 373 N.E.2d 404, 406 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1977).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
31. Id. at § 1692a(6).
32. 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1976).
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attempting to enforce the payment of the debt is covered under the Act as a
supplier.33
C. "Consumer"
A consumer is broadly defined as "a person who engages in a consumer
transaction with a supplier.- 34 However, consumer transaction is defined as
the transfer of a good, service, franchise, or intangible "to an individual" for
primarily personal, household, or family purposes.35 In Toledo Metro Federal
Credit Union v. Ted Papenhagen Oldsmobile,36 an Ohio court, relying on the
comment to section 2(1) of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, held
that "individual" as used in the Ohio Act meant a natural person only and did
not include a corporate entity-in this case a credit union for Toledo munici-
pal employees?' This suggests that a corporate entity can never engage in a
consumer transaction and cannot be a consumer under the Act. Therefore, if
the transaction involves a titled vehicle such as an automobile, truck, or boat
and the title is in the name of a corporation or partnership, the Ohio Act does
not apply.
It is not clear exactly what a "primarily personal, family or household"
purpose is and how it is determined. In Brown v. Howe Motor Co.,38 the
alleged consumers were employees of the Ohio Attorney General's Office
who presented a specially fixed car to the supplier's automotive repair shop
for service. The supplier argued that there was no bona fide consumer trans-
action because the "dealings between plaintiffs agents were never conceived
or carried out primarily for such personal, family or household purposes.-
39
The court dismissed this argument stating, "In so far as the defendant was
concerned, the plaintiffs' agents who brought the cars to defendants for re-
pairs were consumers.', 40 This seems to shift the focus from the actual inten-
tions of the consumer in acquiring an item to what the supplier believes the
consumer's intent to be. The court's interpretation was necessary to allow the
Attorney General to fulfill his statutory duty to prosecute violations of the Act
discovered in an official investigation. 4' However, there is no support in the
33. Liggins v. May Co., 53 Ohio Misc. 21, 23, 373 N.E.2d 404, 406 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1977).
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(D) (Page Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
35. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
36. 56 Ohio App. 2d 218, 381 N.E.2d 1337 (1978).
37. Id. at 220, 381 N.E.2d at 1339. This should not be surprising. The Act itself differentiates between
individuals and corporations. Section 1345.01(B) of the Revised Code defines person as including an "'indi-
vidual, corporation"-distinguishing the two. A consumer transaction can only be engaged in by an individual, a
narrower class than person.
38. No. CV 74-10-0719 (Butler County C.P. August 10, 1977).
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 4.
41. The Act provides for Attorney General investigations in section 1345.05 of the Revised Code. These
investigations often lead to an Attorney General action under section 1345.07 against the supplier. This is an
integral part of the Act's enforcement. Section 1345.10(A) states: -[A] final judgment against a supplier under
section 1345.07 of the Revised Code is admissible as prima-facie evidence of the facts on which it is based in
subsequent proceedings under section 1345.09 of the Revised Code against the same supplier.'
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Act for such an interpretation, and it seems unlikely that the legislature would
have intended such an interpretation given the statute's remedial purpose.
A better rule that would preserve the Attorney General's investigative
authority as well as protect consumers is to make persons conducting such
investigations constructive consumers rather than inquiring into what the
supplier believed the individual's purpose was in acquiring an item.42 In situa-
tions not involving Attorney General investigations, the general rule should
be to look at the person's primary purpose in acquiring the item. For example,
in Toledo Metro Federal Credit Union,43 the court held that an attempt to
repossess a good for the business-related purpose of protecting one's col-
lateral was not a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. In reaching its decision, the court inquired into the plain-
tiffs primary purpose for repossession rather than into what the defendant
believed the plaintiff's purpose was in acquiring the item.44
Some transactions may be entered into for both personal and business
reasons. A transaction need only be entered into primarily for a personal
purpose-not exclusively personal-to be within the scope of the Act. The
amount of overlap permitted between personal and business purposes has not
been dealt with but, since the Act is to be liberally construed, a primarily
personal transaction may contain a significant degree of business purpose as
well 5
D. "Supplier"
A supplier is "a seller, lessor, assignor, franchisor, or other person en-
gaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions, whether
or not he deals directly with the consumer. ' 4 A person is broadly defined as
including an individual or other legal entity. 7 This, plus the Act's liberal
interpretation, means that almost anyone dealing with a consumer is a sup-
plier. Since the supplier need not deal directly with the consumer, the Act has
been applied to wholesalers, 48 assignees collecting debts (including debt col-
lection agencies),49 manufacturers, dealers, and advertising agencies.50 Fur-
thermore, there is probably no requirement of a direct contractual relation-
ship between the consumer and the supplier. A third-party beneficiary of a
42. This rule would be better because under the Howe rationale a consumer could be "penalized" (not able
to bring suit under the Act) by the supplier's incorrect belief of the consumer's purpose in entering the
transaction.
43. 56 Ohio App. 2d 218, 381 N.E.2d 1337 (1978).
44. Id. at 221-22, 381 N.E.2d at 1339.
45. Additional guidance for interpreting primarily personal, family, or household purposes may be found in
U.C.C. § 9-109 (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.07 (Page 1979)) and accompanying case law construing the
definition of "consumer goods."
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(C) (Page Supp. 1980).
47. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(B) (Page Supp. 1980).
48. Brown v. Lancaster Chrysler Plymouth, No. 76 CV-05-2077 (Franklin County C.P. 1976).
49. See Liggins v. May Co., 53 Ohio Misc. 21, 23, 373 N.E.2d 404, 405 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1977). See
also text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
50. See UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT 2(5) (Commissioner's Comment).
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contract is entitled to the remedies available under at least one state's decep-
tive practice statute and there is no reason why this would not be true in
Ohio.
51
The Act covers all Ohio suppliers engaged in consumer transactions re-
gardless of whether the consumer is located inside or outside of Ohio. 2 The
application of the Act to consumers living beyond Ohio's boundaries has been
held to be a constitutional exercise of the state's police power on several
grounds. Among other arguments used by the courts in supporting the consti-
tutionality of the Act's scope, it has been said that fraud is a state law matter
and therefore not subject to federal preemption; that such consumer legisla-
tion does not unduly burden interstate commerce; that fraudulent conduct
does not require national uniformity of law; and that because deceptive and
unconscionable acts are not lawful in interstate commerce they are therefore
subject to state regulation. 53
The Act does not purport to change the existing common law of tort, and
its definition of supplier as anyone who engages in effecting or soliciting
consumer transactions, whether or not they deal directly with the consumer,
would appear to include corporate officers. Corporate officers are presumably
personally liable for violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act per-
formed by them in their corporate capacities54 because the commission of an
unfair and deceptive act has been deemed to be a tort. Otherwise, individual
corporate officers could engage in proscribed activities with impunity and
thus frustrate the purposes of the Act. A corporate entity may be disregarded
when the entity is an implement for avoiding a clear legislative purpose and
when not to do so will defeat public convenience, justify a wrong, or protect
against fraud.55 Also, under the common law of agency, a principal is liable for
those actions of an agent which are within the agent's scope of authority and
which violate the Consumer Sales Practices Act! 6
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES
In determining what is unfair or deceptive conduct, it is important to
understand that the Act creates new substantive rights and remedies that have
previously not been available to an aggrieved consumer in a consumer trans-
action. This being so, a supplier can commit an unfair or deceptive act even
5 I. Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365,358 A.2d 473 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). The court found that
New Jersey's deceptive practice statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 et seq. (West 1964), which is similar to the
Ohio Act, applied to purchasers of a house with recent termite damage. Characterizing the purchasers as
third-party beneficiaries, the court awarded treble damages against the exterminator who had contracted with
the previous owners and certified to the realtor that there was no termite infestation.
52. Brown v. Market Development Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 64-65, 322 N.E.2d 367, 372 (Hamilton County
C.P. 1974).
53. Id. at 66-68, 322 N.E.2d at 372-74.
54. Quality Carpet Co. v. Brown, 6 Ohio Op. 3d 185 (1977).
55. Id.
56. See Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332 N.E.2d 380 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974) (sales persons,
repairman, and employees of appliance sales and service business were agents of owner for whose acts and
practices owner was held liable).
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though he might be innocent of fraud, negligence, or breach of contract' s7 For
example, a seller can commit an unfair or deceptive act even though he might
not have intended to deceive the consumer. Since much unfair or deceptive
conduct often enables the seller to achieve a greater profit, his state of mind or
good faith is not exculpatory when the consumer seeks to recover for an
overcharge. According to the court in Brown v. Bredenbeck,58 an act is decep-
tive if it "has the likelihood of inducing a state of mind in the consumer that is
not in accord with the facts.- 59 Knowledge or intent at the time the represen-
tation is made is immaterial. The place to look to determine the presence of
deception is the state of mind of the consumer and not the intent of the
supplier. 0
Although not an issue in Brown v. Bredenbeck, it is likewise apparent that
a seller can commit an unfair or deceptive act even though no buyer is, in fact,
duped or deceived by the act. Under the case law of other jurisdictions6 and
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,62 an act is unfair or deceptive if it
merely has the tendency or capacity to mislead or deceive the unthinking
consumer, including those that are ignorant, credulous, or just plain dumb.63
Under the Act, a seller can commit an unfair or deceptive act even if no
sale takes place because the prohibition of the Act applies to the solicitation to
supply, as well as the sale, of consumer goods. A seller can also violate the
Act even if the buyer has not been injured.64 An unfair or deceptive act allows
a buyer to rescind the sale if the condition of the good has not substantially
changed since the date of the purchase, or to sue for the greater of $200
or treble his actual damages provided the supplier commits an unfair or
deceptive act which has been previously declared unlawful by substantive
rule or by a judicial decision available in the public inspection file.65
A. What is Unfair or Deceptive Conduct?
Unfair and deceptive conduct is defined by the Act, by administrative
rules promulgated under section 1345.05(B)(2) of the Revised Code, and by
judicial interpretation of the Act. Thus, the Act provides a three-pronged
weapon for consumer protection. Each of these sources varies in scope and
must be consulted independently.
57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (Page 1979).
58. 2 Ohio Op. 3d 286 (Franklin County C.P. 1975).
59. Id. at 287.
60. Beneficial Corp. v. F.T.C., 542 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Chrysler
Corp. v. F.T.C., 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Doherty, Clifford, Steers, and Sheffield, Inc. v. F.T.C., 392 F.2d
921 (6th Cir. 1968). These cases were all cited by the court in Thomas v. Sun Furniture and Appliance Co., 61
Ohio App. 2d 78, 399 N.E.2d 567 (1978), in its finding that proof of common law intent was not necessary under
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. One of the purposes of this Act was to avoid common law fraud proof
of intent requirements. Brown v. Bredenbeck, 2 Ohio Op. 3d 286, 287 (Franklin County C.P. 1975).
61. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 47 App. Div. 868, 366 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1975).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1914). See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FederalTrade Commission,
143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
63. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (Commissioner's Comment).
64. See, e.g., Weaver v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 53 Ohio App. 2d 165, 372 N.E.2d 633 (1977).
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979).
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1. Statutory Definitions
The first prong of the consumer's weapon is the language of the Act itself,
which prohibits all unfair or deceptive conduct in connection with a consumer
transaction. Although the Act does not define the meaning of unfairness,66 it
does give ten illustrations of deceptive conduct. Because the following list is
non-exhaustive 67 it does not provide a comprehensive definition of deceptive
acts.
(B) Without limiting the scope ... of this section, the act or practice of a
supplier in representing any of the following is deceptive:
(I) That the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, per-
formance, characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits that it does not have;
(2) That the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality,
grade, style, prescription, or model, if it is not;
(3) That the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not;
(4) That the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a
reason that does not exist;
(5) That the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance
with a previous representation, if it has not, except that the act of a supplier in
furnishing similar merchandise of equal or greater value as a good faith substitute
does not violate this section;
(6) That the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity
than the supplier intends;
(7) That replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(8) That a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
(9) That the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation that he does not
have;
(10) That a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a
disclaimer of warranties or other rights, remedies, or obligations if the representa-
tion is false. 6
While the above illustrations are largely self-explanatory, a few com-
ments are necessary. The intent mentioned in the sixth illustration is not
intent to deceive but refers instead to the amount of goods the supplier intends
to have in stock.6 9 The supplier's intent can be inferred from the amount of
66. Although the word *'unfairness" cannot be precisely defined, the Court in FrC v. Sperry & Hutchin-
son, 405 U.S. 233 (1972), adopted three tests to determine ifa supplier has committed an unfair act in violation of
the FTC Act. A court must decide whether the particular act or practice
(I) without necessarily having been considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been estab-
lished by statutes, the common law or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the
penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [or] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to con-
sumers.
Id. at 234 n.5. For a list of state courts that have adopted these tests see Leaffer and Lipson, Consumer Actions
Against Unfair or Deceptire Acts or Practices: The Prirate Uses of FTC Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 521, 537 n.100 (1980).
67. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B) (Page 1979).
68. Id.
69. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 3(b)(6) (Commissioner's Comment).
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stock on hand and his outstanding delivery orders. The prohibition includes
bait advertising.70 Cases decided prior to the amendment of the administrative
rules on bait advertising7' hold that the failure to give a raincheck after the
original quantity of goods is exhausted or the refusal to take orders for de-
livery at the advertised price violates the Act, unless the supplier clearly
discloses the specific quantity of goods or services available.72 The words
"while they last" are not specific enough to constitute a disclosure of the
quantity of goods available under this rule, and it is an unfair or deceptive act
or practice to fail to offer a raincheck or take an order when the stock is
exhausted in such circumstances.7
The tenth illustration prohibits the supplier from misrepresenting any
rights, remedies, or obligations of either the consumer or the supplier. This
would include stating that a consumer must pay for unsolicited goods or
services or that a supplier can garnish exempt wages.74 A supplier who ac-
cepts a deposit must provide written notice to the consumer stating whether
the deposit is refundable and under what circumstances. The failure to do so
is a deceptive act 5 Also, a supplier who takes money from consumers for
goods or services and allows an unreasonable length of time to pass without
either making delivery, making a full refund, notifying the consumer of the
delay and offering a refund, or offering goods of an equal or greater value as a
good faith substitute, commits an unfair or deceptive act.76
The tenth illustration also makes the failure of a supplier to honor express
and implied warranties of merchantability an unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice. 77 This is particularly significant because the Act offers remedies that are
unavailable under the Uniform Commercial Code for breach of warranty. By
way of example, assume a consumer has purchased a new automobile from a
dealer because of some representations made to him by the car salesman at
the time of the sale of the car. The consumer receives a limited written
warranty from the manufacturer which gives an express and implied warranty
but which limits the consumer's remedies to the repair and replacement of
parts if the warranties are breached. The written warranty further disclaims
any liability for consequential damages. The consumer also receives a pur-
chase order from the dealer disclaiming all warranties from the sale, save
those made by the manufacturer of the vehicle. The purchase order likewise
excludes from the contract all oral representations made by the salesman
about the vehicle. Assume further that the car is defective and shortly after
70. Id.
71. OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-03 (1977).
72. Weaver v. J.C. Penney Co., 53 Ohio App. 2d 165, 168, 373 N.E.2d 633, 636 (1977).
73. Katz v. Sears Roebuck Co., No. 78 Ca. 152 (Mahoning County Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1979).
74. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 3(b)(10) (Commissioner's Comment).
75. Riley v. Enterprise Furniture Co., 54 Ohio Misc. 1,375 N.E.2d 821 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1977). See OHIO
AD. CODE § 109:4-3-07 (1977).
76. Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 20, 332 N.E.2d 380, 385-86 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974).
77. Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332 N.E.2d 380 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974). See Potter v.
Dangler, 61 Ohio Misc. 14, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 329 (Paulding County C.P. 1977).
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the purchase fails to conform to the oral representations made by the sales-
man.
In this example, if the consumer seeks to sue in contract or in tort he will
have a difficult time. In contract, he will be faced with a multitude of prob-
lems: a small amount of damages with no provision for the recovery of at-
torney's fees, disclaimers of warranties and limitations regarding any liability
for consequential damages, evidentiary problems regarding the admissibility
of the oral statements not contained in the purchase order, and the contract
clause limiting his remedies to the repair and replacement of defects.78 In
order to recover damages or rescind the purchase, the consumer must
establish that the clause limiting his remedies has failed of its essential pur-
pose under U.C.C. section 2-719(2). To do this, he must keep the car and
document the seller's repeated failure to repair problems with the vehicle. If the
consumer seeks rescission, such actions place him in a difficult position because
the more he uses the car to document continued defects and the inability of the
car dealer to repair such defects, the more the condition of the vehicle
changes and, under U.C.C. section 2-608(2), revocation of acceptance is not
possible if the condition of the vehicle is substantially changed from the date
of the purchase. If the consumer seeks to avoid these problems by suing in
fraud and claiming punitive damages and attorney's fees, he is faced with the
difficulty of proving actual malice and that the seller knowingly lied.
If, however, a consumer seeks rescission or damages by alleging the
commission of unfair or deceptive acts, he will have a much easier time
obtaining his requested relief. As said before, the Consumer Sales Practices
Act operates independently of contract and tort principles and is therefore not
limited by the common-law rules of disclaimers, waivers, privity, and
scienter. Under the Act, it is unfair and deceptive in connection with a con-
sumer transaction to breach express or implied warranties, to make any
statement in a sales presentation that could create in the mind of a reasonable
consumer a false impression as to any feature of the car, and to fail to inte-
grate into any written sales contract or offer all material statements, repre-
sentations, or promises, oral or written, made prior to the written contract by
the dealer.79 An actionable representation need not rise to the level of an
express warranty and can include statements of opinion.'0 If a seller makes
oral statements about a car to the consumer which are not true, even if they
are innocently made, and if such statements are not integrated into the con-
tract, the consumer can rescind the sale or sue for treble damages plus attor-
ney's fees, notwithstanding the problems of disclaimers of warranties, parol
78. Another potential problem is that the consumer cannot revoke his acceptance against the dealer
because it gave no warranties and cannot revoke his acceptance against the manufacturer because it is not the
seller of the vehicle. Generally, this argument has not been successful in Ohio. See Eckstein v. Cummins, 41
Ohio App. 2d 1 (1974). See also Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977). But see
Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980).
79. OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-16(b)(22) (1980).
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(A)(6) (Page 1979).
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evidence, disclaimers of consequential damages, and scienter-all of which
plague actions where the complaint is styled under breach of contract or
fraud.
This expansion of rights and remedies contained in the Act is not limited
to the conduct illustrated in section 1345.02(B). The scope of unfair and
deceptive conduct is also defined by administrative rules.
2. Administrative Regulations
Section 1345.05(B) authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate sub-
stantive rules to implement the Consumer Sales Practices Act,81 thereby cre-
ating the second prong of the consumer's weapon. The substantive rules
adopted to date82 establish definitions of deceptive or unfair conduct that are
far more detailed than the per se violations illustrated in section 1345.02(B) of
the statute. Since the scope of rule making power is not limited to the activi-
ties illustrated in section 1345.02(B), the Attorney General is free to extend
the protection of the Consumer Sales Practices Act to specific situations
likely to involve unfair or deceptive conduct. For example, Ohio Administra-
tive Code section 109:4-3-13 presents extensive guidelines for consumer
transactions involving motor vehicle repairs or services. These guidelines go
far beyond the statutory prohibition against representations "[t]hat replace-
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B) (Page 1979) provides:
(B) The director may:
(2) Adopt, amend, and repeal substantive rules defining with reasonable specificity acts or prac-
tices that violate sections 1345.02 and 1345.03 of the Revised Code. In adopting, amending, or repealing
substantive rules defining acts or practices that violate section 1345.02 of the Revised Code, due
consideration and great weight shall be given to federal trade commission orders, trade regulation rules
and guides, and the federal courts' interpretations of subsection 45(a)(1) of the "'Federal Trade Com-
mission Act," 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. 41, as amended.
(The powers originally conferred upon the Director of Commerce were transferred to the Attorney General by
Amended Substitute Senate Bill 221 of the 112th General Assembly (effective Nov. 23, 1977)). See also Weaver
v. J.C. Penney Co., 53 Ohio App. 2d 165, 372 N.E.2d 633 (1977), approving this rule making authority.
82. Substantive rules address the following:
(2) Exclusions and Limitations in Advertisements, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-02 (1977).
(3) Bait Advertising, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-03 (1981). See Weaver v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 53
Ohio App. 2d 165, 373 N.E.2d 633 (1977).
(4) Use of the word "Free" etc., OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-04 (1977).
(5) Repairs and Services, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-05 (1978).
(6) Prizes, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-06 (1977). See Brown v. Market Development Inc.. 41 Ohio
Misc. 57, 322 N.E.2d 367 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974).
(7) Deposits, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-07 (1977). See Riley v. Enterprise Furniture Co., 54 Ohio
Misc. I (Sylvania County Mun. Ct. 1977).
(8) New for Used, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-08 (1977).
(9) Failure to Deliver-Substitution of Goods, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-09 (1977).
(10) Sale of Motor Vehicles, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-10(1977). Effective August 28, 1981, this
rule was replaced by § 109:4-3-16 (1981) (Advertisement and Sale of Motor Vehicles).
(11) Direct Solicitations, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-11 (1977).
(12) Price Comparisons, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-12 (1977).
(13) Motor Vehicle Repairs or Services, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-13 (1978).
(14) Insulation, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-14 (1978).
(15) Motor Vehicle Rust Inhibitors, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-15 (1980).
(16) Advertisement and Sale of Motor Vehicles, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-16 (1981).
(17) Distress Sales, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-17 (1981).
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ment or repair is needed, if it is not."-8 3 In addition to prohibited acts or
practices, affirmative duties and disclosure requirements are created by the
rule. 84
83. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B)(7) (Page 1979).
84. Motor Vehicle Repairs or Services, OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-13 (1978). Subsections (A) and (B) set
out the written and oral disclosure requirements regarding the consumer's right to an estimate if the expected
cost of any repair or service is more than 25 dollars. Subsection (C) provides:
(C) In any consumer transaction involving the performance of any repair or service upon a motor
vehicle it shall be a deceptive act or practice for a supplier to:
(I) Make the performance of any repair or service contingent upon a consumer's waiver of any
rights provided for in this rule;
(2) Fail, where an estimate has been requested by a consumer, to obtain oral or written authoriza-
tion from the consumer for the anticipated cost of any additional, unforeseen, but necessary repairs or
services when the cost of those repairs or services amounts to ten per cent or more (excluding tax) of
the original estimate;
(3) Fail, where the anticipated cost of a repair or service is less than twenty-five dollars and an
estimate has not been given to the consumer, to obtain oral or written authorization from the consumer
for the anticipated cost of any additional, unforeseen, but necessary repairs or services when the total
cost of the repairs or services, if performed, will exceed twenty-five dollars;
(4) Fail to disclose prior to acceptance of any motor vehicle for inspection, repair, or service, that
in the event the consumer authorizes commencement but does not authorize completion of a repair or
service, that a charge will be imposed for disassembly, reassembly, or partially completed work. Any
charge so imposed must be directly related to the actual amount of labor or parts involved in the
inspection, repair, or service;
(5) Charge for any repair or service which has not been authorized by the consumer;
(6) Fail to disclose upon the first contact with the consumer than any charge not directly related to
the actual performance of the repair or service will be imposed by the supplier whether or not repairs or
services are performed;
(7) Fail to disclose upon the first contact with a consumer the basis upon which a charge will be
imposed for towing the motor vehicle if that service will be performed;
(8) Represent that repairs or services are necessary when such is not the fact;
(9) Represent that repairs have been made or services have been performed when such is not the
fact;
(10) Represent that a motor vehicle or any part thereof which is being inspected or diagnosed for a
repair or service is in a dangerous condition, or that the consumer's continued use of it may be harmful,
when such is not the fact;
(il) Materially understate or misstate the estimated cost of the repair or service;
(12) Fail to provide the consumer with an itemized list of repairs performed or services rendered,
including a list of parts or materials and a statement of whether they are used, remanufactured or
rebuilt, if not new, and the cost thereof to the consumer, the amount charged for labor, and the identity
of the individual performing the repair or service;
(13) Fail to tender to the consumer any replaced parts, unless the parts are to be rebuilt or sold by
the supplier, or returned to the manufacturer in connection with warranted repairs or services, and
such intended reuse or return is made known to the consumer prior to commencing any repair or
service;
(14) Fail to provide to the consumer upon his request a written, itemized receipt for any motor
vehicle or part thereof that is left with, or turned over to, the supplier for repair or service. Such receipt
shall include:
(a) The identity of the supplier which will perform the repair or service;
(b) The name and signature of the supplier or a representative who actually accepts the motor
vehicle or any part thereof;
(c) A description including make and model number or such other features as will reasonably
identify the motor vehicle or any part thereof to be repaired or serviced;
(d) The date on which the motor vehicle or any part thereof was left with or turned over to the
supplier;
(15) Fail, at the time of the signing or initialing of any document by a consumer, to provide the
consumer with a copy of the document;
(16) Fail to disclose to the consumer prior to the commencement of any repair or service, that any
part of the repair or service will be performed by a person other than the supplier or his employees, if
the supplier disclaims any warranty of the repair or service performed by that person, in addition the
supplier shall disclose the nature of the repair or service which that person will perform, and if
requested by the consumer, the identity of that person.
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Because new substantive rules appear in the Administrative Code rather
than as amendments to the Act, and because extensive regulations may
address unfair or deceptive acts or practices not specified in the Act, the
administrative regulations should be considered an independent source in
defining unfair or deceptive conduct.
3. Case Law
The third prong of the weapon made available to consumers by the Act is
case law. Section 1345.09(B) implicitly provides that declarations by Ohio
courts that certain conduct is unfair or deceptive are to be incorporated into
the Act itself upon filing of the opinion with the Attorney General's office.85
However, the courts are not limited to the language of the Consumer Sales
Practices Act in deciding that conduct is unfair or deceptive. They are also
empowered to look to the language of other Ohio statutes and, more impor-
tantly, to the federal consumer protection laws.8 6
a. Federal Law
One federal remedial law providing consumer protection is the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Deceptive practices affecting commerce are pro-
hibited by section 5 of this Act. 7 Under this section the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) issues guidelines on prohibited practices as well as trade regu-
lation rulings having the force of federal law. 8 The FTC has taken the lead in
consumer protection over the years,8 9 but it was not until 1976 that it had
jurisdiction over purely intrastate transactions. Its prior jurisdiction was
limited to practices in interstate commerce.?
The effectiveness of the Commission in protecting consumers is ques-
tionable. The FTC alone is responsible for enforcing the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and the guidelines and rules promulgated thereunder. Courts
have historically found no private cause of action implied from the Act.9' The
FTC receives over 9,000 complaints a year, is able to investigate only 1,000,
and only 100 result in a cease and desist order.92 Moreover, these orders are
prospective in effect and provide no redress for injured consumers.
Section 1345.02(C) of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act provides
that in determining unfair or deceptive acts "the court shall give due consi-
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979).
86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1979).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I) (1976).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1976).
89. Tongren & Samuels, The Development of Consumer Protection in the Attorney General's Office, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 581, 581 (1976).
90. Id. at 581-82. See F.T.C. v. Bunte, Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
91. Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Contra, Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the
Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Indiana 1976) (in which the court implied a private right of action for a violation
of an FTC cease and desist order).
92. Eckhard, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 663, 670 (1970), citing COX, FELLMETH &
SCHULTZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 58-59 (1969).
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deration and great weight to Federal Trade Commission orders, trade regula-
tion rules and guides, and federal courts' interpretations of" deceptive acts in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.93 The Uniform
Act, after which the Ohio Act is modeled, also has as one of its purposes "to
make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with the
policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protec-
tion." 94 In Santiago v. S. S. Kresge Co.,95 an Ohio court recognized the
significance of section 1345.02(C) stating: "Where a practice has been de-
clared unfair by the commission charged with enforcing national standards in
consumer transactions, this Court has no difficulty finding that it also violates
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.' 96 The phrase "due consideration
and great weight" in the Ohio Act does not mean that all Federal Trade
Commission orders, rules, and guides are per se incorporated into Ohio law.
Although Santiago stated that the court had no difficulty finding that acts and
practices prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission were also prohibited
by the Consumer Sales Practices Act, a judge may exercise discretion in
determining when Federal Trade Commission requirements should be applied
through the Consumer Sales Practices Act in the context of a specific case.
Deceptive nondisclosures may also violate the Consumer Sales Practices
Act. Although the Federal Trade Commission has never posited an affirma-
tive duty of a seller to "tell all" about his goods or services, it has required the
seller to make certain disclosures where the goods may be dangerous to use
without proper instructions, or where the goods are used, rebuilt, or defec-
tive. At least one state has said the failure to disclose a defective car engine at
the time of the car's sale is actionable under its deceptive practices statute.
97
In addition to the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Consumer Sales
Practices Act appears to incorporate violations of the Magnuson-Moss
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1979).
94. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 1(4).
95. 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1976).
96. Id. at 55. See also Leaffer and Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices: The Private Uses of FTC Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1980), for a comprehensive
survey of the role of the FTC Act in state consumer actions. For a list of state decisions incorporating FTC
standards of unfair and deceptive conduct see id. at 534 n.85.
97. Slaney v. Westwood Auto Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975). A number of other courts have
held the failure to disclose material facts in connection with a consumer transaction to be an unfair or deceptive
act. See, e.g., Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1979).
On August 14, 1981, the FTC adopted a trade regulation rule concerning the sale of used motor vehicles. 16
C.F.R. § 455 (1981). The rule requires dealers to post a window sticker ("Used Car Buyer's Guide") on used
cars offered for sale to consumers. The window sticker explains to consumers that spoken promises are difficult to
enforce, and that consumers should ask that all promises be put in writing. The sticker also lists 14 systems of
the car (for example, "frame and body," "engine," "'transmission drive and shaft"). Dealers are required to
disclose any defects in these systems which are known to them. Additionally, the sticker informs consumers
whether or not a warranty or service contract is offered with the car and how the warranty, service contract, or
the lack of such protection, affects the consumer's right to have the dealer make repairs on the car after sale.
This trade regulation rule should be used in defining unfair or deceptive conduct under OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(C) (Page 1979). See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
19811
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Warranty Act,98 which deals with consumer product warranties. Section
110(b) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act states that any violation of that
Act is also a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 99 The language in section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act is identical to that used in section
1345.02(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. This would make a violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the administrative rules promulgated
thereunder an unfair or deceptive act under federal law and probably under
Ohio law as well.
It also appears that an act or practice that violates Title VIII of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, also known as the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 00 can be a violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act. In
Smith v. S.G. & B., Inc.,0° the court held the act of communicating with an
employer of a customer for any purpose other than verifying employment and
current residential address is an unfair or deceptive and unconscionable act or
practice. This incorporates into Ohio law the provisions in Title VIII regulat-
ing the communications a third-party collector can legally engage in with a
debtor's employer.' °2
An act or practice that violates Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, known as the Truth in Lending Act,'0 3 can also violate the Consumer
Sales Practices Act. The Truth in Lending Act applies to consumer transac-
tions in which credit is extended by a retail 'seller or supplier of services. In
Ellis v. Hensley,'°4 a violation of part of Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending
Act'05 was found to violate the Consumer Sales Practices Act. The court held
the supplier's failure to disclose that a security interest attached under the
sales contract and the failure to limit the attachment to after-acquired
property acquired within ten days of the transaction violated Regulation Z and
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976). This is important because a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act gives rise to a civil cause of action only if the consumer is "damaged" by the supplier's failure to comply.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). For example, if a supplier has violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by failing
to properly label his warranty, see 15 U.S.C. § 2303, to draft the text therefore, see 16 C.F.R. § 700 (1981), orto
disclose the terms of the warranty prior to the sale, see 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1981), a consumer has no actual
damages and therefore has no cause of action under the Act. If he alleges such non-compliance as an unfair and
deceptive act under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, however, he can rescind the transaction or possibly
recover $200.00 in damages, plus attorney's fees.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
101. No. A-79000178 (Hamilton County. C.P. 1979).
102. Id.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
104. No. 39126 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. August 16, 1979).
105. The Truth in Lending Act was enacted by Congress "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms" so the consumer would be able to shop around and compare all the credit terms available to him and to
"avoid the uninformed use of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (Supp. 1980). Section 1604 of theTruth in LendingAct
empowers the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to carry out these purposes. These regulations are
known as Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-15 (1981), and provide the real substance of the Truth in Lending Act.
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the Truth in Lending Act. 16 The court stated that the Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act "must be read in light of the Truth in Lending Act." 0 7
However, it does not appear that every violation of the Truth in Lending
Act is a violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act. In Ellis, the defendant-
supplier also violated a part of Regulation Z requiring each component of the
finance charge to be disclosed when the finance charge consists of two or
more types of charges.'08 In this case, the interest charge and service charge
were not separately disclosed as the components of the finance charge. This
was held to violate the Truth in Lending Act and the Ohio Retail Installment
Sales Act,' 9 but the court did not mention any violation of the Consumer
Sales Practices Act. The court failed to lay down any standard to determine
which violations of Regulation Z also violate the Consumer Sales Practices
Act. It apparently relied on section 1345.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, which
prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices, to find that the failure to
disclose the security interest violated the Consumer Sales Practices Act." '
All violations of Regulation Z, which regulates the disclosure of terms in
credit sales and leases, should be found to constitute unfair or deceptive acts.
The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to promote the informed use of
credit.' If certain disclosures are not made or are incorrect, the consumer
cannot accurately compare credit terms with those available elsewhere. Ab-
sent an accurate basis for comparison, the consumer could enter into a given
transaction thinking it offers the best credit terms when it does not. This is
certainly unfair and deceptive since it induces a state of mind not in accord
with the facts." 2 Moreover, although Regulation Z is highly technical,' the
Federal Reserve Board obviously felt its disclosure requirements were
needed to promote the informed use of credit. Arguably then, the failure to
make the required disclosures impedes a consumer seeking the best credit
terms available and is unfair and deceptive. A court that finds some violations
of the Truth in Lending Act not significant enough to violate the Consumer
Sales Practices Act will be defining different degrees of deception-some
degrees being more significant than others. This is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Truth in Lending Act and the Consumer Sales Practices Act,
neither of which defines a hierarchy of prohibited acts.
106. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1980), required the description or identification of any security interest that
attached in the transaction. This section had been construed to require the disclosure that a floating lien on
after-acquired property was limited to property acquired within ten days of the transaction under U.C.C.
§ 9-20412) (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.15 (Page 1980). Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Finance Co.,531 F.2d 815
(7th Cir. 1976). This section has been superceeded by 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (effective April I. 1982).
107. Ellis v. Hensley, No. 39126 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. August 16, 1979) at 4.
108. Id. The portion of Regulation Z that is referred to here can be found at 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(c)(8)(i) (1981).
109. Ellis v. Hensley, No. 39126 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. August 16, 1979) at 4. The Ohio Retail
Installment Sales Act can be found at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.01-16 (Page 1980).
110. Ellis v. Hensley No. 39126 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. August 16, 1979) at 4.
11I. See Id. at 4-5. See also note 105 supra.
112. See Brown v. Bredenbeck, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 286, 287 (C.P. Franklin County 1975).
113. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1981).
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The Consumer Sales Practices Act does not address whether remedies
available under its provisions are cumulative to those available under federal
law for the same conduct. In Ellis v. Hensley,"4 the court held that the
IIremedies provided under the state law are not cumulative to those provided
by federal law."' 5 In so holding, the court reasoned from the premise that
Congress intended that consumers should receive no more than what could be
recovered for violations of the Truth in Lending Act. An award of damages
under the Consumer Sales Practices Act in addition to or in excess of damages
under the Truth in Lending Act would be contrary to such intent and would
therefore be preempted under the Supremacy Clause. By this reasoning the
court was forced to construe the Consumer Sales Practices Act narrowly,
saving its constitutionality by finding that the remedies for violations of the
Ohio Act were not cumulative with those granted by the Truth in Lending
Act.
The problem with the Ellis rationale is its premise: Congress did not
intend to limit the recovery for credit disclosure violations to that authorized
by the Truth in Lending Act where state law is also violated. In Public Fi-
nance Corp. v. Riddle,"6 the court stated:
This holding [the decision of the court below that remedies are not cumula-
tive] was based on Ninth Liberty Loan Corp. v. Hardy. In that case, the final
paragraph of the opinion contained a statement to the effect that the remedies
afforded by the Illinois and Federal Acts were duplicitous and not cumulative.
However, no authority was cited for this statement and we believe that it does not
accurately state the law. If Ninth Liberty were to be followed, then consumers
would be forced to elect between state and federal remedies. There is nothing to
indicate that Congress intended to force consumers to elect their remedy. In fact,
section 111 of TILA, 15 U.S.C. sec. 1610, specifically states that TILA "does not
annul, alter, or effect, or exempt any creditor from complying with, the laws of
any State relating to the disclosure of information in connection with credit trans-
actions . . . . This, and subsequent sections, clearly show an intent to create
parallel remedies, federal and state. Other jurisdictions have held that provisions
of a contract can violate both state law and TILA and have permitted the sanctions
of both Acts to be applied. For example, in Ballew v. Associates Financial Ser-
vices Co., the court held that provisions of a contract violated both state and
federal law and awarded damages under TILA and barred the lender from collec-
ting or receiving interest as provided for in the Nebraska Small Loan Act.
Further, in Hernandez v. Kerrv Buick, Inc., the court held that a customer
could recover under both TILA and the Illinois Motor Vehicle Retail Installment
Sales Act for the same failure to disclose financing terms. We believe the Illi-
nois... Act is similar enough to the Large Loan Act to apply Hernandez. In view
of the purpose of the statute, its wording, and resulting case law, we believe that a
consumer may recover under both TILA and the Large Loan Act. 117
114. No. 39126 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. August 16, 1979).
115. Id. at 9-10.
116. 83 III. App. 3d 417, 403 N.E.2d 1316 (1980).
117. Id. at 422, 403 N.E.2d at 1320 (citations omitted).
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This rationale exists for all the federal laws that are designed to protect the
consumer. State legislation that is more protective of the consumer is not
inconsistent with federal statutes, but is merely complementary. Cumulative
remedies should therefore be available under both state and federal sta-
tutes."'
Other jurisdictions have split on the issue of state and federal cumulative
recoveries. In Texas, recovery is allowed under both the Truth in Lending
Act and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act.' 9
In Cantrell v. First National Bank of Euless, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
said -[w]hile we doubt that provision for imposition of penalties by both
the federal and state laws were intended by either the Congress or Texas
legislature, yet the rules of construction compel that we hold in accord" with
precedent and allow a cumulative recovery.2 - On the other hand, an Illinois
Court of Appeals found the remedies provided by the Truth in Lending Act
and the Illinois Consumer Finance Act 2' as "duplicitous, not cumulative.'-
22
b. Ohio Legislation
No Ohio court has squarely confronted the issue whether a violation of
the State's Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA)' - also violates the Consumer
Sales Practices Act. RISA is the rough equivalent of the Truth in Lending Act
on the state level and regulates every consumer transaction payable in in-
stallments.'2 4 As a logical matter, at least some violations of RISA could also
be found to constitute unfair or deceptive acts under the Consumer Sales
Practices Act. Because many violations of the Truth in Lending Act are also
violations of RISA' -s and the failure to make certain disclosures required by
Regulation Z has been held to be a deceptive act under the Consumer Sales
Practices Act,' 6 it is possible that some acts or practices could violate all
three Acts.
In Brown v. Maidstone,27 the court seemed to imply that, at least in
certain instances, a violation of RISA is also a violation of the Consumer
118. Another problem that arises in connection with the cumulation of remedies is whether a consumer can
pursue a violation of a federal consumer law, such as the Truth in Lending Act, by pleading such violation as an
unfair and deceptive act where the statute of limitations has passed on the federal law (one year for the Truth in
Lending Act) but has not passed on the state law claim (two years for the Consumer Sales Practices Act). The
few cases on point are split. See Conrad v. Homes & Auto Loan Co., Inc., 53 App. Div. 2d 48,385 N.Y.S.2d 979
(1976) (state limitation period applied); Manzina v. Publishers Guild, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 241, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (state statute of limitations was repealed because of conflict with limitation period of the Truth in Lending
Act).
119. 2 TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1968 & Supp. July 1981). This Act
resembles the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act in purpose and content.
120. 560 S.W.2d 721. 729-30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). The court relied on McDonald v. Savoy, 501 S.W.2d
400, 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), as precedent.
121. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 19 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1966).
122. Ninth Liberty Loan Corp. v. Hardy, 53 I11. App. 3d 601, 607, 368 N.E.2d 971, 975 (1977).
123. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.01 et seq. (Page 1979).
124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.01(A) (Page 1979).
125. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
126. Ellis v. Hensley, No. 39126 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. August 16, 1979) at 5.
127. No. 75-12-3026 (Summit County C.P. Nov. 5. 1976).
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Sales Practices Act. The case was brought by the Ohio Attorney General to
enjoin the defendant-supplier from certain illegal actions in its attempts to
enforce payment of claims arising from consumer transactions. The list of
violations included falsely threatening legal action, threatening attachment or
garnishment of wages when there was no judgment against the consumer, and
communicating with the consumer by false legal documents. 28 In none of
these instances did the court specifically refer to any statute to justify the
issuance of a permanent injunction. At the end of the opinion, the court
simply enjoined the defendant's practices because they failed to comply with
the Consumer Sales Practices Act.129 The implication of the decision is that
these acts violate the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The court also included in the list of enjoined acts those statements made
by the defendant that violated section 1317.031 of the Ohio Revised Code.
This section is part of RISA and, prior to the August 1980 amendments, stated
that a consumer who executes an installment note in a consumer transaction
can assert any defense he or she has against the supplier as a defense against a
holder in due course. The holder can nullify any of the consumer's claims or
defenses by sending a notice to the consumer containing the name and
address of the holder and retail seller, the amount due, the statutory deadline
date for a reply by the consumer, and a paragraph warning the consumer that
the note has been transferred and all claims and defenses must be asserted
before the deadline or payment in full will be required.'30 The supplier in
Brown did not send this notice, but instead indicated to the consumer that he
was legally liable to the supplier and that it would be useless for the consumer
to assert any claims or defenses against the supplier. The court stated this was
a violation of RISA and included it in the list of enjoined acts.' 3' Although it
was not expressly stated, this may indicate that the court felt this violation of
RISA also violated the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The expansion of the Consumer Sales Practices Act to include violations
of other consumer legislation is of great benefit to the consumer. For ex-
ample, RISA provides no remedy for violations of section 1317.031 of the
Revised Code. The Consumer Sales Practices Act overcomes the deficiency
when a violation of this section of RISA is found to also violate the Consumer
Sales Practices Act.
The remedies provided by the Act are in addition or cumulative to those
remedies available for the same conduct under other state and local laws.' 32
This allows the consumer to recover any damages available under RISA
(should a court find that a violation of RISA also violates the Consumer Sales
128. Id. at 2-3.
129. Id. at 3.
130. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.03. 1(A) and (B) (Page 1980). Pursuant to the 1980 Amendments to this
section, it is no longer possible for a holder to nullify a consumer's claims or defenses by giving notice.
131. No. 75-12-3026 (Summit County C.P. Nov. 5, 1976) at 2.
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.13 (Page 1979).
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Practices Act) in addition to those available under the Consumer Sales Prac-
tices Act. Consumers can also recover damages, and possible treble damages,
under the Home Solicitation Sales Act 33 and the Prepaid Entertainment
Act. 1
34
Because any conduct that violates public policy, federal or state law,
administrative rule or regulation, or municipal ordinance may be unfair or
deceptive under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the consumer is not
limited to federal or state consumer law in establishing that specific conduct is
unfair or deceptive. For example, the Ohio Administrative Code prescribes
license standards and requirements for many professional trades within the
state. 13 A detailed list of prohibited state practices is contained in the Ap-
pendix to this Article. In addition, local ordinances may also offer a source of
authority in defining the meaning and application of the Consumer Sales
Practices Act. The city of Columbus, for example, has enacted consumer
legislation for Home Improvement Contractors 36 and for Home Solicitation
(Door-to-Door) Sales. 37
c. Public Inspection File
The substantive rules promulgated under section 1345.05(B)(2) of the
Revised Code are published in the Ohio Administrative Code, 38 but the judi-
cial decisions interpreting the Act are found only in the Attorney General's
office. The Attorney General is required to:
Make available for public inspection ... all judgments, including supporting
opinions, by courts of this state that determine the rights of the parties and con-
cerning which appellate remedies have been exhausted, or lost by the expiration of
the time for appeal, determining that specific acts or practices violate section
1345.02 or 1345.03 of the Revised Code.139
This is referred to as the Public Inspection File and -[tihe purpose of [this file]
is to make such decisions and judgments have the effect of substantive
law."' 40 In particular, if an act committed by a supplier has been previously
declared unlawful by a judicial decision available in the File, the consumer
133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21 et seq. (Page 1979).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.41 et seq. (Page 1979).
135. The Ohio Administrative Code contains licensing and other requirements for the following profes-
sions: Architecture (ch. 4703). barbers (ch. 4709), chiropractic (ch. 4734), cosmetology (ch. 4713), dentistry (ch.
4715). engineering (ch. 4733). medicine (ch. 4731). nursing (ch. 4723), nursing home administration (ch. 4751),
occupational therapy (ch. 4755), optometry (chs. 4725, 4726), pharmacy (ch. 4729), psychology (ch. 4732), and
speech pathology and audiology (ch. 4753).
136. COLUMBUS, OHIO CODES ch. 4114 (1981).
137. COLUMBUS, OHIO CODES ch. 2937 (1952).
138. See OHIO AD. CODE. § 109:4-3 er seq. (1978 & Supps.).
139. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(A)(3) (Page 1979).
140. Hawkins v. Inland Marina, Inc., No. 79-CV-09-4500 at I (Franklin County C.P. Sept. 8, 1980). A court
cannot take judicial notice of the content of the public inspection file. Consequently, in order to get a case which
is on file into the record to recover treble damages, a party should obtain a certification from the Consumer
Fraud Division of the Office of the Attorney General. The case would then be admissible as a certified public
record under Rule 902 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.
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may sue for treble "actual damages or two hundred dollars, whichever is
greater."141
Prior to September 8, 1980, the Public Inspection File was indexed only
by the defendant's name and not by subject matter. This made it difficult and
time consuming to research any single matter. There was nothing in the files
that indicated the right to appeal had been lost by exhaustion of appellate
remedies or the expiration of time. Furthermore, prior to November 5, 1979,
no record was kept of the date a case was filed. To determine this, the general
practice was to call the attorney who filed the case. In Hawkins v. Inland
Marina, Inc.,4 z the defendant challenged the sufficiency of these arrange-
ments. The court held that the file must contain only those judgments or
decisions for which all appellate remedies were exhausted or lost by the
expiration of time. Only then could the cases in the file have the effect of
substantive law and be the basis of a treble actual damages recovery by a
consumer, and "anything less would certainly fail constitutional muster."1
43
The court also felt that a subject matter index would be a sine qua non for this
Public Inspection File since "[t]he purpose is to let all persons know what is
and is not an unfair or deceptive consumer sales practice when the same has
not been spelled out in full by the Code itself."' 44
The Attorney General's office has since complied with the Hawkins
court's guidelines. From a policy standpoint, however, more should be done.
A great number of the cases in the Public Inspection File are unreported
decisions and the only way to discover what is contained in the File is to go to
the File itself. The Attorney General is required to "[inform consumers and
suppliers on a continuing basis of acts or practices which violate section
1345.03 of the Revised Code.' 4 The Attorney General has made available to
the public a listing of several important decisions, entitled Index of Significant
Consumer Protection Litigation, which contains a brief summary of court
decisions through October 1, 1980. While this is helpful, something more
should be required as a matter of fairness to suppliers. Suppliers should have
more than token constructive notice of the judgments and decisions contained
141. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979). The constitutionality of awarding treble damages
based on cases in the Public Inspection File has not been directly addressed by any Ohio court. In Hawkins v.
Inland Marina, Inc., No. 79-CV-09-4500 (Franklin County C.P. September 8, 1980), the defendant challenged
the constitutionality of this arrangement but the court disposed of the case solely on the statutory grounds
discussed in the text accompanying notes 142-44 infra. The Attorney General's subsequent compliance with the
Hawkins court's guidelines appears to have laid to rest the issue of the constitutionality of awarding treble
damages based on cases in the Public Inspection File.
142. No. 79-CV-09-4500 (Franklin County C.P. Sept. 8, 1980).
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id. at 2-3.
145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(A)(4) (Page 1979). Cases presently on file in the Public Inspection
File have held a number of acts or practices to be unfair and deceptive, including the breach of express or implied
warranties (Potter v. Dangler, 61 Ohio Misc. 14, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 329 (Paulding County C.P. 1977); Brown v.
Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 322 N.E.2d 380 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974)), the performance of unworkmanlike
work (Gaughan v. Billingsley, No. 79-CV-05-2103 (Franklin County C.P. July 12, 1979)), the failure to make
timely delivery of products (Brown v. Lyons, supra), and the failure to comply with provisions of the Home
Solicitation Sales Act (Brown v. Rawleigh Banks, No. 944618 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1976)).
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in the Public Inspection File, especially given the harshness of a treble actual-
damage award. Also, if the contents of the File were more readily available to
the public, more Ohio consumers would be encouraged to bring suit under the
Consumer Sales Practices Act. One of the purposes of the Act is to provide
consumers with a more substantial remedy than is available at common
law. 46 This goal is not fulfilled if the public is unaware of its rights and
remedies. A looseleaf service published by the Attorney General's office or
an exhaustive pamphlet supplemented by current court decisions that dis-
closes the contents of the File would serve both functions and put more
meaning and substance into the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The publication of cases interpreting the Act and the contents of the
Public Inspection File would also aid the courts in applying and interpreting
the Act uniformly. Most of the cases dealing with the Act are unreported
decisions. This sometimes leads to divergent decisions on the same issue in
different parts of the state.
B. Unconscionable Conduct as a Violation of the Act
Unconscionable acts or practices by a supplier in connection with a
consumer transaction violate the Consumer Sales Practices Act. 47 Uncon-
scionability is a matter for the court to decide and usually involves some basic
unfairness in the transaction such as terms that are too one-sided.141 Section
1345.03(B) of the Act lists seven circumstances for courts to consider in
determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable:
(1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the
consumer to reasonably protect his interests because of his physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an
agreement;
(2) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered
into that the price was substantially in excess of the price at which similar property
or services were readily obtainable in similar consumer transactions by like
consumers;
(3) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered
into of the inability of the consumer to receive a substantial benefit from the
subject of the consumer transaction;
(4) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered
into that there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full by
the consumer;
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a consumer transac-
tion on terms the supplier knew were substantially one-sided in favor of the
supplier;
146. See Thomas v. Sun Furniture and Appliance Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 78,81,399 N.E.2d 567,570 (1978).
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(D) (Page 1979).
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(A) (Page 1979).
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(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of opinion on
which the consumer was likely to rely to his detriment;
(7) Whether the supplier has, without justification, refused to make a refund in
cash or by check for a returned item that was purchased with cash or by check,
unless the supplier had conspicuously posted in the establishment at the time of
the sale a sign stating the supplier's refund policy. 49
Unlike the ten deceptive acts listed in section 1345.02(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code, these seven circumstances are not per se violations. Instead they serve
as guides for the courts . 5  In addition, no administrative rules have been
promulgated to further define unconscionable acts or practices.
It is not clear whether the Act requires consumers to prove scienter to
establish an unconscionable act or practice. The terms of the Ohio statute,
which are far from conclusive, suggest knowledge is not an element of uncon-
scionability. First, section 1345.03(A) of the Revised Code,' 51 which sets forth
the Act's general prohibition against unconscionable practices, contains no
explicit knowledge element. If this section declared that no supplier shall
knowingly commit an unconscionable act, then there would be no doubt that
consumers are required to prove the supplier's knowledge or intention to act
unconscionably. Second, although six of the seven circumstances listed
above explicitly require the supplier to act knowingly, these are only circum-
stances to be considered in determining whether an act is unconscionable.
Moreover, the Uniform Consumer Sales Act precedes its list of the same six
circumstances with the following language: "iT]he court shall consider cir-
cumstances such as the following of which the supplier knew or had reason to
know."' 52 If the Uniform Act is used to aid interpretation where the Ohio Act
is ambiguous, this language suggests that knowledge is not a prerequisite to
unconscionability; that mere reason to know is sufficient.153
Given the ambiguities in the statutory language, it is not surprising that
Ohio courts have failed to achieve a consensus on the scienter issue. At least
one court appears to have adopted a reason to know standard. In Brown v.
Coluitbus Remodeling and Builders, Inc. 54 the court held it unconscionable
to misrepresent to consumers "that home remodeling work will be performed
pursuant to a contract when defendants have reason to know that said work
will not be completed."' 55 By contrast, one of the few federal court cases
decided under the Ohio Act seems to require proof of a knowing act. In
Clayton v. McCary,5 6 the district court, "[l]ooking at the [relevant] circum-
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(B) (Page 1979).
150. Id.
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(A) (Page 1979) provides: "No supplier shall commit an uncon-
scionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unconscionable act or practice by a
supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction."
152. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4(c) (emphasis added).
153. The Commissioner's Comments to the Uniform Act indicate that, "'Although probative, this scienter
is not invariably required in order to establish unconscionability." Id. (Commissioner's Comments).
154. No. 77-CV-03-1107 (Franklin County C.P. June 13, 1978).
155. Id. at 2.
156. 426 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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stances... in light of the knowledge requirement" found no unconscionable
act or practice.157 The court did recognize that there is a "paucity of case law on
the Act."'58
Finally, some cases are simply ambiguous. For example, Brown v.
Market Development, Inc. 59 holds that the activity of the supplier, not the
character of the completed transaction or the consumer's actual mental state,
is pivotal in determining unconscionability.' 6 The case can be read to suggest
that a suppler's actual intent is not relevant in determining unconscionability,
but an alternative reading is equally plausible. The court may have been
referring to language in the Act's definition of knowledge. Section 1345.01(E)
of the Revised Code defines knowledge as "actual awareness, but such actual
awareness may be inferred where objective manifestations indicate that the
individual involved acted ivith such awareness. "161
Whether scienter or something less is required under the Ohio Act will
affect the ability of consumers to prove a supplier's act was unconscionable,
but this should not materially affect a consumer's ability to recover damages
in a given case. If a consumer fails to prove the existence of a knowing act, he
may still be able to prove that the act was unfair or deceptive. Deception does
not require proof of a supplier's knowing act and includes violation of all
Federal Trade Commission orders, guides, rules, and federal court interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 62 A consumer may also rely on
the substantive rules promulgated under section 1345.05(B)(2) of the Ohio
Revised Code that declare certain acts unfair or deceptive and in violation of
the Consumer Sales Practices Act. 63 Thus, a supplier may escape a charge of
unconscionability for certain questionable acts but will find it hard to avoid
ultimate liability to the consumer. This was the case in Clayton. The court
found no per se unfair or deceptive act and no unconscionable act, but found a
violation of substantive rule 109:4-3-10 of the Administrative Code entitling
the consumer to a remedy under the Consumer Sales Practices Act."
Ohio courts have had no trouble in finding a supplier's acts or practices
unconscionable in circumstances other than the seven listed, but the acts have
been fairly flagrant. One court has found that a supplier who "consistently
maintains a pattern of inefficiency, incompetency, or continually stalls and
evades his legal obligations to consumers, commits an unconscionable act or
practice.' A65 In Santiago v. S. S. Kresge Co.,'66 another court found the
157. Id. at 261.
158. Id.
159. 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 322 N.E.2d 367 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974).
160. Id. at 62, 322 N.E.2d at 371.
161. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(E) (Page 1979) (emphasis added).
162. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page 1979). See text accompanying notes 58-60 and 93-113
supra.
163. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B) (Page 1979). See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
164. Clayton v. McCary, 427 F. Supp. 248, 260 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-10
(1977) (effective August 28, 1981, this section was replaced by § 109:4-3-16).
165. Brown v. Lyons, 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 21, 332 N.E.2d 380, 386 (Hamilton County C.P. 1974).
166. 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1976).
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supplier's practice of suing individuals in a distant forum-southwestern
Ohio-when the transactions took place in northeastern Ohio, to be uncon-
scionable. The court noted the inconvenience and expense suffered by con-
sumers not wanting to have a default judgment entered against them. The fact
that the supplier-defendant usually secured default judgments effectively de-
nied the consumer his day in court-a right that is the basis of the American
legal system and the denial of which is unconscionable. 67 In both cases the
courts did not examine whether the supplier had acted with intent or was
actually aware of the nature of his acts and their unconscionable tendencies,
although the acts themselves would allow that inference."f
IV. PRIVATE REMEDIES
The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act contains two basic private
remedy provisions. First, section 1345.09(A) of the Revised Code grants the
consumer the right to "rescind the transaction or recover his damages" where
the supplier commits an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an-unconscion-
able act or practice. 69 Second, section 1345.09(B) allows an individual con-
sumer to "rescind the transaction or recover ... three times the amount of
his actual damages or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater," where the
supplier commits an act declared unconscionable or unfair or deceptive by a
case in the Public Inspection File or by rule adopted by the Attorney
General.'70 Other damages and remedies, including attorney's fees, may also
be sought.
A. Damages or Rescission
1. Rescission
To rescind a transaction under either of the above-mentioned provisions,
the consumer need only revoke "within a reasonable time after [he or she]
discovers or should have discovered the ground for [revocation] and before
[there is] any substantial change in [the] condition of the subject of the con-
sumer transaction.' 17' Identical language appears in the Uniform Commercial
Code, but the Code also contains other prerequisites to revocation of accept-
ance. 72 These elements include the substantial impairment of value, the ac-
ceptance of the goods on the reasonable assumption that their non-conformity
would be cured and that the defects have not been reasonably cured, and, if
acceptance was reasonably induced by difficulty of discovery before accept-
167. Id. at 55-56.
168. This would add support to the contention that knowledge is only one circumstance to consider in
determining unconscionability and, even if it is necessary, the Ohio courts do not dwell on this issue.
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(A) (Page 1979).
170. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979).
171. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(C) (Page 1979). Rescission is not mentioned as a remedy under the
Uniform Act.
172. U.C.C. § 2-608(B) (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.66 (Page 1979)).
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ance or by the seller's assurances, then an absence of discovery of the non-
conformity at the time of acceptance.
Despite the clear advantages to seeking rescission under the Consumer
Sales Practices Act, the provisions of the Act are not entirely one-sided. An
action to rescind must be preceded by an effective revocation-a requirement
that has received substantial judicial attention. In Peterman v. Waite,'73 the
court held the consumer must take some specific action (such as tender of
possession) that unequivocally serves as notice to the supplier that the con-
sumer is receptive to or contemplating rescission. The consumer must allow
the supplier to make an intelligent decision with respect to the consumer's
right to rescind. 174 In Peterman, the court found the plaintiff had failed to take
such action. The supplier delivered an automobile to the plaintiff on Novem-
ber 8, 1978, and the plaintiff experienced stalling problems five days later.
After repairs, this same problem occurred on two more occasions over a three
month period. The plaintiff then filed the complaint to institute this action but
did not tender possession of the automobile and continued to drive it for the
five month period preceeding a trial on the merits.7' This did not meet the
requirements of a revocation, which is necessary "as a condition precedent to
relief by way of rescission.' -76 The court thus construed the Ohio Consumer
Sales Practices Act in light of Uniform Commercial Code case law under
section 2-608, which prohibits the interim use of goods after a suit is filed and
pending the outcome of that litigation.'"
Presiding Judge Putnam, in dissent, felt that filing the complaint within
three months of the transaction date was an act of revocation within a reason-
able time: "The consumer is helpless to do other than putter about with her
stalling car which presumably she needs to make a living. She cannot
promptly park it on her dealers' door-step and walk away. She has nothing
else to drive and presumably, no money to buy a second car." 78 In addition,
the judge noted that the consumer cannot be sure how the lawsuit will turn
out. 7 9 Requiring a tender of possession under these circumstances is unduly
harsh. A better rule would be to require an act of revocation reasonable under
the circumstances, such as the filing of a complaint. Since the Act is remedial
in nature, the consumer should not be required to go to unreasonable lengths
to revoke.
The consumer must also rescind the transaction before any "substantial
change [occurs] in [the] condition of the subject of the consumer transac-
173. No. 79-CA-19 (Knox County Ct. App. June 25, 1980).
174. Id at 7. The court relied on U.C.C. § 2-608(a) (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.66(B) (Page 1979)) in
defining revocation.
175. Peterman v. Waite, No. 79-CA-19 (Knox County Ct. App. June 25, 1980) at 8-10.
176. Id. at 10.
177. See U.C.C. § 2-608(3) and § 2-602 (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.66 and 1302.61 (Page 1979)).
178. Peterman v. Waite, No. 79-CA-19 (Knox County Ct. App. June 25, 1980) at 12 (Putnam, J., dissent-
ing).
179. Id.
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tion."' 8 ° In Clayton v. McCary, the consumer replaced the original 1967 en-
gine (which had locked up due to a lack of oil resulting from a damaged oil
pan) in a used automobile purchased from the defendant with a newer engine
which later locked up due to an oil leak. This was held to be substantial
change in the condition of the automobile which precluded the remedy of
rescission. 18' This provision was inserted to protect suppliers from being
forced to accept goods that were damaged or excessively worn.
It may not always be necessary, however, for the consumer to return the
merchandise in its original condition. When to do so is impracticable or in-
equitable, the rescinding buyer may only be required to tender its reasonable
value. The Illinois deceptive practices statute provides that a buyer may
cancel a door to door sales contract by returning the merchandise "in its
original condition."'' 82 In Hurlbert v. Cottier,83 the court held the statutory
purpose of this provision is to restore the status quo ante, and, when materials
such as siding have been substantially altered in their application, this re-
quirement cannot be observed. The consumer was required to tender the
reasonable value of the siding measured as of the date of installation. The
court relied on the federal Truth in Lending Act's rescission provision' 84 be-
cause the Illinois legislature intended consultation with federal laws and
federal court decisions when the Illinois statute appears deficient.'85 Under
the Ohio Act, the tender of the reasonable value of goods when their return is
impracticable or inequitable should also be allowed.
2. Alternative Remedies
It appears from the statutory language that the consumer must elect a
remedy-rescission or damages-under the Ohio Consumer Sales Act. Sec-
tions 1345.09(A) and 1345.09(B) both refer to the consumer's right to "rescind
the transaction or recover ... damages."' 86 In addition, the courts of at least
one state have taken the view that damages are inconsistent with the remedy
of rescission after a fraudulent misrepresentation. In a North Carolina case,
Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc., 87 the buyer alleged reliance upon the
seller's misrepresentation of a 1970 Porsche as a 1971 model and sought actual
damages in the amount of the purchase price ($4,600). In a default judgment,
the trial court awarded the consumer treble damages ($13,800) because the
dealer's misrepresentation violated the state deceptive practices act. Upon
satisfaction of the judgment, the consumer was ordered to tender the 1970
180. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(C) (Page 1979).
181. Clayton v. McCary, 426 F. Supp. 248, 262 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
182. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262B (1960 & Supp. 1981).
183. 56 I1. App. 3d 893, 372 N.E.2d 734 (1978).
184. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1980). While there are no Ohio cases reaching this result, the appropriate
arguments have apparently never been presented to an Ohio court. However, the Illinois Act is substantially the
same as the Ohio Act and there is no reason why an Ohio court should not adopt the Illinois court's rationale.
185. Hurlbert v. Cottier, 56 Il. App. 3d 893, 896-97, 372 N.E.2d 734, 736 (1978).
186. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.09(A) and 1345.09(B) (Page 1979) (emphasis added).
187. 27 N.C. App. 711, 220 S.E. 2d 806 (1975).
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Porsche to the dealer. The appeals court held that since it was clear that the
plaintiff was seeking to rescind the sales contract and recover the $4,600 sales
price, he was not damaged or injured within the meaning of the deceptive
practices act so as to warrant a treble damages recovery.'88
3. Damages
The "damages" referred to in section 1345.09(A) of the Ohio Revised
Code most likely encompass both actual and consequential damages. This
section originally allowed the recovery of "actual damages" and the deletion
of the word "actual" by a 1978 amendment' 9 indicates the legislature in-
tended a broader meaning than restitution. The same amendment repealed the
portion of section 1345.12(C)'9gof the Ohio Revised Code that excluded re-
coveries for damages to property other than the property that was the subject
of the consumer transaction.' 9' This is additional evidence of legislative intent
that consequential damages are recoverable under section 1345.09(A) of the
Revised Code. Finally, section 1345.09(B) of the Revised Code still pro-
vides the consumer may recover treble "actual damages."' 192
Under section 1345.09(B) of the Ohio Revised Code the meaning of the
word "damages" and the appropriate measure of recovery are not clear.
Some courts have measured damages by out of pocket expenses, 93 others by
the reasonable costs to repair the defects in the product,'T94 and still others
allow a consumer to recover his out of pocket expense or the benefit of the
bargain, whichever is greater.9"
B. Two Hundred Dollars or Treble Actual Damages
The Act provides for the recovery of the greater of two hundred dollars
or treble actual damages:
Where the violation was an act or practice declared to be deceptive or uncon-
scionable by rule adopted under division (B)(2) of section 1345.05 of the Revised
Code before the consumer transaction on which the action is based, or an act or
practice determined by a court of this state to violate section 1345.02 or 1345.03 of
the Revised Code and committed after the decision containing the determination
188. Id. at 716, 220 S.E.2d at 811.
189. Amended Substitute House Bill 861 (effective August 11, 1978), 1978 OHIO LAWS 3227.
190. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.12(C) (Page 1979).
191. Amended Substitute House Bill 861 (effective August II, 1978), 1978 OHIO LAWS 3230.
192. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979) (emphasis added). It could be argued that the failure
to delete "actual" from this section in 1978 was merely a legislative oversight.
193. See, e.g., Jack Criswell Lincoln Mercury v. Haith, 590 S.W.2d 616, 619 (rex. Ct. App. 1979). Cf
Potter v. Dangler Mobile Homes, 61 Ohio Misc. 14, 24, 401 N.E.2d 734. 736 (Paulding County C.P. 1977).
194. See, e.g., Young v. DeGuerin, 591 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); Harrison v. Dallas Court
Reporting College, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 813, 816-17 (rex. Ct. App. 1979).
195. York v. Sullivan, 369 Mass. 157, 165, 338 N.E.2d 341, 349 (1975); Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256,
262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 589 (1977). Some courts have further
allowed recovery for mental distress. See, e.g., Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671-72 (Tex. 1977); Salois
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355,358,581 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1978); Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn.
Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (1979).
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has been made available for public inspection under division (A)(3) of section
1345.05 of the Revised Code the consumer may rescind the transaction or recover,
but not in a class action, three times the amount of his actual damages or two
hundred dollars, whichever is greater, or recover damages or other appropriate
relief in a class action under Civil Rule 23, as amended.196
One likely reason for the existence of this section is to encourage consumer
enforcement of the Act by making recoveries more lucrative. At the same
time, this section penalizes suppliers who commit acts or practices that are
already clearly defined as unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable. The re-
coveries can be substantial. In Gaughan v. Billingsley, 97 the plaintiffs re-
covered $36,720.00 in treble actual damages because the supplier engaged in
selling practices that had been held to be deceptive in Brown v. Columbus
Remodeling and Builders, Inc.,'"8 a decision available in the Public Inspection
File.
The award of treble damages contains both a compensatory and punitive
element, usually thought to be in a ratio of one-to-two. 99 The minimum two
hundred dollar recovery provided in this subsection is an enforcement
mechanism designed to encourage consumers to act as private attorneys
general and bring suit against suppliers who violate the Act. Any damage
recovery under this subsection can be said to consist of compensatory
and enforcement elements, and the legislature probably intended a puni-
tive element to recoveries in this situation.
C. Attorney's Fees
The Consumer Sales Practices Act provides:
The Court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to
the work reasonably performed, if either of the following apply:
(I) The consumer complaining of the act or practice that violated this Chapter has
brought or maintained an action that is groundless, and the consumer filed or
maintained the action in bad faith;
(2) The supplier has knowingly committed an act or practice that violates this
Chapter. 200
Ohio courts have not acted with any uniformity in deciding whether to award
reasonable attorney's fees to consumers under the Act. This is especially
196. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1980). It may be significant that the consumercan recover
only treble actual damages. Section 1345.09(A) of the Revised Code provides for the recovery of damages. This
may mean that a treble damage recovery will not include the consumer's consequential damages. See text
accompanying notes 188-95 supra.
197. No. 79 CV-05-2103 (Franklin County C.P. July 12, 1979).
198. No. 77-CV-03-1107 (Franklin County C.P. June 13, 1978).
199. Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REV. 286,
287 (1973).
200. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(F) (Page 1979) (emphasis added).
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troubling because the consumer's ability to recover such fees may determine
whether he will seek to enforce his rights and pursue redress under the Act.20'
In Hamilton v. Davis Buick Co.,2"2 the court held "the word 'knowingly'
in 1345.09(F)(2) must relate to knowledge that the act violates the law. 203
Under this interpretation, for the consumer to be awarded attorney's fees the
supplier must not only violate the Act, but must actually be aware that his
actions constitute a violation. It is hard to believe this interpretation was
intended by the legislature. It is a well known common law maxim that ignor-
ance of the law is no excuse. 204 The Hamilton rationale would reward sup-
pliers who were ignorant of the existence of the Consumer Sales Practices Act
and its provisions by not awarding consumers reasonable attorney's fees-
even if the supplier flagrantly violated the Act. The better approach is to
award attorney's fees when the supplier acts knowingly-that is, with
scienter. This interpretation is more reasonable. The statutory language of
this section should be interpreted to require the supplier to commit a knowing
act or practice that violates chapter 1345 of the Revised Code. The language
does not state the supplier must act with the knowledge that his actions
violate the Act, but simply requires the supplier to commit a knowing act.
Although the legislature must have intended the knowledge requirement to
limit the situations in which a consumer could recover attorney's fees, it is
doubtful that it intended to limit it only to situations where the supplier acted
knowing he was violating the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
It would be illogical to deny attorney's fees to the consumer whenever a
supplier violates a substantive rule or commits an act judicially determined to
violate the Consumer Sales Practices Act after such decision is placed in the
Public Inspection File. The purpose of the substantive rules and cases in the
Public Inspection File is to give notice to all persons of "what is and is not an
unfair or deceptive [or unconscionable] consumer sales practice when the
same has not been spelled out in full by the Code itself.- 205 Suppliers are liable
for the greater of two hundred dollars or treble actual damages. This shows
the legislature intended to hold suppliers to a higher level of responsibility for
acts or practices that clearly violate the Act. Suppliers are charged with notice
of these rules and court decisions whether or not they are actually cognizant
201. The possibility of recovering attorney's fees would encourage consumers to bring suit under the Act.
Where a consumer seeks rescission or a small damages award, he may be deterred from bringing suit by high
attorney fees. Several courts have awarded attorney's fees in excess of the consumer recovery in Truth in
Lending cases for this reason, see Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973), and
also allowed legal aid societies to receive reasonable attorney's fees, see Ecenrode v. Household Finance Corp.
of South Dover, 422 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Del. 1976).
202. No. 79-1875 (Montgomery County C.P. June 24, 1980).
203. Id. at 7.
204. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1951), said
"The knowledge requisite to a knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from
knowledge of the law. I do not suppose the Court intends to suggest that ifpetitioner knew nothing of the existence
of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a defense."
205. Hawkins v. Inland Marina Inc., 79 CV-09-4500 at 2-3 (Franklin County C.P. September 8, 1980).
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of them and in that sense they may be said to have acted knowing they were
violating chapter 1345 of the Ohio Revised Code. Suppliers should also be
charged with such knowledge for purposes of attorney's fees. In such situa-
tions, the legislature has already manifested an intent to punish and encourage
enforcement.2" Even under the Hamilton rule, the award of attorney's fees
to the consumer would be consistent with that purpose.
There are no Ohio cases specifically addressing the reasonableness of
attorney's fees or what is to be considered when awarding them. It is likely,
given the remedial nature of the Ohio Act, that attorney's fees are recoverable
for work done at all court levels. In Texas, the statutory provision for "at-
torney's fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended" under
the deceptive practices statute includes work done at the appellate level as
well as the trial level.20 7 Furthermore, since the statute lists no specific facts
requiring independent proof, the judge can rely on this firsthand knowledge of
the services performed before him and need not hold an evidentiary hearing as
to the proper amount to be awarded. The crucial factors to be considered are
the length of the trial, the difficulty of the legal and factual issues involved,
and the degree of competence the attorney demonstrates. The standard of
reasonableness depends on what the services were objectively worth and not
on the attorney's usual charge.2H
D. Punitive Damages
Given a finding of actual malice, punitive damages should be available
under the Consumer Sales Practices Act since an unfair or deceptive or un-
conscionable act or practice is in the nature of a statutory tort. In Brown v.
Lyons,209 punitive damages of two hundred fifty dollars were awarded to
consumer intervenors in an action brought by the Attorney General against an
appliance dealer who continually stalled and evaded his legal obligations to
consumers. The court found the defendant intentionally and knowingly misled
and took advantage of consumers. 2'0 However, because this action was
brought by the Attorney General under section 1345.07 of the Revised Code,
there was no private remedy available to the consumer intervenors under the
Consumer Sales Practices Act.
It is not clear whether a consumer can recover two hundred dollars or
treble actual damages under the Consumer Sales Practices Act and also re-
cover punitive damages. Arguments can be made to support either position.
On one hand, consumer advocates argue that a consumer should be able to
recover both treble and punitive damages because each damage award serves
a different purpose and requires different elements of proof. Treble damages
206. See text accompanying notes 196-201 supra.
207. Volkswagon of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
208. See Heller v. Silverbrand Construction Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978).
209. 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332 N.E.2d 380 (Hamilton County C.P. 1979).
210. Id. at 17, 332 N.E.2d at 384.
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do not require a finding of actual malice and are designed to encourage a
consumer to bring suit by expanding his recoverable damages. Punitive
damages do require a finding of actual malice and are designed to punish the
wrongdoer for outrageous conduct. On the other hand, opponents argue that a
consumer should not be able to recover treble and punitive damages because
they both punish the defendant by allowing a consumer to recover more than
his actual damages. If the treble damage award under section 1345.09(B) of
the Revised Code is punitive in nature, then it is not logical to tack on addi-
tional punitive damages3" The issue has not yet been decided in Ohio. 2
E. Other Remedies
There are other remedies available to the consumer under the Ohio Con-
sumer Sales Practices Act. The "consumer may seek a declaratory judgment,
an injunction, or other appropriate relief against an act or practice that vio-
lates this chapter. 21 3 A consumer can also threaten a supplier with seeking
the revocation or suspension of the supplier's license or permit. 14 This sec-
tion gives consumers some bargaining power in settlement discussions be-
cause occupations with high potentials for consumer fraud are commonly
licensed, including debt collectors, vocational schools, funeral directors,
automobile and mobile home sellers, nursing home owners, employment
agencies, television repairmen, auto repairmen, plumbers, electricians, appli-
ance repairmen, and optometrists.
Although not expressly mentioned in the Act, there may be an additional
implied remedy for consumers. The traditional common law remedy of rescis-
sion contemplates the consumer tendering goods to the seller and then seek-
ing rescission of the contract. Rescission suggests that the two parties be
returned to their original positions with neither side gaining by the trans-
action. Courts will thus try to return the parties to the status quo. This does
not hold true, however, if a contract is found unenforceable. Illegal contracts
or those involving "unclean hands" are not enforced by the courts. The
parties are left to their own devices.2 l A consumer who has received his end
of the bargain but still owes payments will realize a windfall if the agreement
is found unenforceable. And, an agreement that violates the Consumer Sales
Practices Act may be construed as illegal and thus unenforceable.
211. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). In a concurring opinion, three justices held
that the recovery oftreble damages under the state deceptive practices statute was a remedy punitive in nature that
excluded the right to recover punitive damages for fraud. See also Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying note 199 supra.
212. In Osai v. A & D Furniture Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 99, 428 N.E.2d - (1981), the court reversed a
decision of the appellate court that limited an award made by the trial court of punitive damages to three times
the actual damages sustained by the consumer-plaintiffs. The Ohio Supreme Court did not decide whether
punitive damages were available to redress violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act or whether such
damages were available in addition to punitive damages.
213. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(D) (Page 1979).
214. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.11(D) (Page 1979).
215. See Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corporation, 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965); Massilon Savings and
Loan Co. v. Imperial Finance Co., 114 Ohio St. 523, 151 N.E. 645 (1926).
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In Bennett v. Hayes,26 a car mechanic repaired the consumer's car but
failed to give him a written estimate as required by state law. The consumer
refused to pay for the repairs and the mechanic brought suit on the contract
and in quantum meruit. A California appellate court held the contract unen-
forceable and illegal because the mechanic had not given the required written
estimate. Since the contract was illegal, the seller also could not recover in
quantum meruit. 27 Ohio has a similar law regarding written estimates for auto
repairs1 8 and there is nothing to prohibit an Ohio court from applying this
rationale to the Consumer Sales Practices Act. However, because such a
remedy is extreme and works a forfeiture on the supplier, Ohio courts may be
reluctant to adopt it.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act presents the potential for the
explosive growth of consumer remedies far beyond those available under
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, RISA, the Fair Debt Collection
Act, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and the
common law of contract or tort. The Act creates new substantive rights and
remedies that are not limited by privity, parol evidence, disclaimers, limita-
tions of consequential damages, scienter, or bad faith. Therefore, an allega-
tion of unfair or deceptive conduct should become the first consideration in
raising a consumer complaint. Because conduct in violation of the Act is
tortious it is possible to pierce the corporate veil and establish personal li-
ability against individual officers or employees.
The Act, however, is not without its weaknesses. It has been effective in
protecting consumers from unfair or deceptive or unconscionable sales prac-
tices and has generated much case law. However, few of these decisions have
been reported and this is the main problem facing consumer enforcement of
the Act. There is a low level of public awareness of the Consumer Sales
Practices Act and the remedies it provides. From the consumer's standpoint,
the result is some aggrieved consumers failing to seek redress under the
Act.219 From the seller's standpoint, the result is unwary suppliers finding
themselves liable for treble actual damages or facing a class action for dam-
ages. 220 Both results can be avoided by more publicity of consumer rights and
remedies under the Act. More decisions, at least at the appellate level, should
216. 53 Cal. App. 3d 700, 125 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1975).
217. Id. at 704, 125 Cal. Rptr. at _. Accord Daniel's Brake, Alignment and General Auto Repair v.
Tograla, No. H79-1874 (lst Cir. Hawaii 1979); Brooks v. P.A. Clark's Garage, Inc., 117 N.H. 770, 378 A.2d 1144
(1977).
218. OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-05 (1978). See note 84 supra.
219. Section 1345. 10(C) of the Revised Code, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.10(C) (Page 1979), provides a
two year statute of limitation-which is more generous than most consumer oriented statutes-and allows a
consumer to raise the Act as a counterclaim in a suit arising out of the same transaction at any time.
220. Damages or other appropriate relief can be recovered in a class action under Civil Rule 23. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979).
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be reported, and some sort of general subject index of unreported decisions
should be published and made readily available. The Attorney General's Pub-
lic Inspection File is the closest such arrangement, but it contains only cases
filed by attorneys and not all cases dealing with the Act are so filed. Uniform
interpretation and application of the Act by Ohio courts has suffered because
of the lack of reported case law. This works to the detriment of both con-
sumers and suppliers. A uniformly applied and highly visible Consumer Sales
Practices Act is in the best interest of all Ohio citizens.
APPENDIX
Prohibited State Practices
GENERAL PRACTICES
False. unfair, or deceptive acts
Unconscionable acts. generally
Lack of good faith, generally
SPECIFIC PRACTICES (Advertising.
representations)
Deceptive pricing and bargain
offers
Use of the word "'Free"
Bait advertising, unavailability
Disparaging goods, services or
business of another
Misrepresentations regarding
nature of manufacturer
Passing Off
Misrepresentations regarding
sponsorship, approval,
affiliation
Weights and measures, price per
unit
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.01, .02 (Page 1979)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.01, .03 (Page 1979); U.C.C. § 2-302 (OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1301.09 (Page 1979))
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.09 (Page 1979) (U.C.C. § 1-203)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(B)(8), .03(B)(2), .03(B)(5) (Page 1979); OHIO AD.
CODE § 109:4-3-12 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1333.35-.37 (Page 1979) (bankruptcy and receiver's sales);
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.01
et seq. (Page 1980) (deceptive trade practices)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-04 (1977)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-03 (1977)
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02(H) (Page 1980)
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02 (Page 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 925.21-.32 (Page
Supp. 1980) (packages and containers for fruits and vegetables)
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02(A) (Page 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3741.01 et
seq. (Page 1980) (oils and paints and gasoline)
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02(B), (E) (Page 1980); Consumer Sales Practices Act,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B)(1), (9), .03(B)(3) (Page
1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1327.46 et seq. (Page 1979); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 911. 18-.20 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1980)
(bakeries) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 925.21-.32 (Page Supp. 1980)
(fruits and vegetables); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 925.51 et seq.
(Page 1968)
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Other quantity misrepresentations
Packaging
Labeling, adulteration, identity
Other quality, grade, standard,
ingredient misrepresentations
Non-disclosure of full terms
of transaction
SALES APPROACHES
Door to Door sales
Sales representative's status
Oral promises not in contract
Unsolicited goods
Premiums, prizes with sale
PERFORMANCE PRACTICES
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4165.02(E) (Page 1980); Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B)(6) (Page 1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3717.32-.34 (Page 1980) (milk); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1327.46 et seq. (Page 1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3741.01 et seq. (oils; paints;
gasoline); 3717.51-.55 (frozen desserts); Pure Food and Drug
Law, § 3716.38 (honey); Pure Food and Drug Law, § 3715.24-.27
(maple sugar and syrup); Pure Food and Drug Law § 3716.14-.20
(fruits and vegetables) (Page 1980). OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 911.18-.20 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1980) (bread); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 913.22-.28 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1980) (soft drinks); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 925.21 etseq. (Page 1968 &Supp. 1980)
(fruits and vegetables)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(B)(2), (3), (4), (7), (9) (Page 1979); Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (C), (F), (G)
(Page 1980)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02
(B)(6), (8), (10), .02(D) (Page 1979); OHIO AD. CODE
§ 109:4-3-05,08, 11, 13, 14(1977)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21-.28 (Page 1979); OHIO AD.
CODE § 109:4-3-11 (1977)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-11 (1977)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.26 (U.C.C. § 2-313), 1302.29
(U.C.C. § 2-312) (Page 1979); OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-16
(1981)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.60 (Page 1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.01 (Page 1979) (trading stamps);
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-06 (1977)
Theft through deception
Simulation
Substitution of inferior goods
Merchantability, fitness
Sale of used as new, prior use
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (Page Supp. 1980)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.32 (Page 1975)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(B)(5) (Page 1979); OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-09
(1977)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1320.27, .28 (Page 1979) (U.C.C.
§8 2-314, 2-315)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(B)(2), (3) (Page 1979); OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-03
(1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02(E), (F) (Page
1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.19 (Page 1973) (motor
vehicles)
Delay, nondelivery, nonexistent
product
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-09 (1977)
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Layaway plans, deposits
Disposal of goods left in
possession
Repairs and services, including
automobiles, home appliances,
and home improvements
PAPER TRANSACTIONS
Forgery, tampering, destruction
of documents
Future service contract
Adhesion contracts, warranty
disclaimers
Warranties. rights, remedies
Installment sales
Debt collection
Confidential information
INDUSTRY SPECIFIC PRACTICES
Insulation
Automobile sales
Mobile homes
Hearing aids
Funeral Practices
Health spas, dancing studios,
dating services, and studios
of martial arts
Motor Vehicle Rust Inhibitors
OPPORTUNITY SCHEMES
Referral sales
Pyramid sales
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-07 (1977)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.22-.26 (Page 1979) (goods left for
cleaning or storage); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.41 (Page
1979) (bailee's liens)
Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02
(B)(7), .03(B)(6) (Page 1979); OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-05 and
109:4-3-13 (1978)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.31 ,.42 (Page 1975)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.41-.51 (Page 1979) (prepaid
entertainment contract)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.16 (Page 1979) (U.C.C. § 2-302);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1979) (U.C.C. § 2-316);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(A), .03(B)(I), (5) (Page
1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26-.28 (Page 1979) (U.C.C.
§§ 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315); Consumer Sales Practices Act. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B)(10) (Page 1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.01 et seq. (Page 1979) (RISA)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.46-48 (Page 1979) (U.C.C.
§§ 9-503. 9-504, and 9-505)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.55 (Page 1979) (Tax information)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-14 (1978)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-16 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4517.20-.26, .40-.45 (Page Supp. 1980)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.09-.20 (Page 1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4747.01 et seq. (Page 1977)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4717.01 et seq. (Page 1977)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.41 etseq. (Page 1979) (Prepaid
entertainment contracts)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-15 (1980)
OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-11 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1345.02(D) (Page 1979)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.91 et seq. (Page 1979)
1981]
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OHIO AD. CODE § 109:4-3-06 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2915.01 et seq. (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4143.01 et seq. (Page 1970)
